In their fight to topple Gaddafi, Libya’s rebels were united in a common cause, but with his death the revolution enters a defining stage.
We could see children playing in the streets as William Hague’s heavily protected six-vehicle convoy hurtled through central Tripoli for a meeting with Mustafa Jalil, chairman of Libya’s National Transitional Council. But the air of normality on show in Tripoli earlier this week was at least partly deceptive. For the past month, Libya has been in limbo. None of the really big issues could be resolved until Sirte fell, and Gaddafi was killed or captured.
Now, at last, “national liberation” can be declared, and a transitional government formed. But many have been dreading this moment, because they see it as the moment of truth. Consider this: all recent Western interventions, from Afghanistan to Iraq, started suspiciously well. Regime change was the easy bit. Only afterwards did trouble start – and this may yet prove to be the case in Libya.
The militiamen who have been fighting in Sirte will be drifting back to Tripoli. There they will come into contact with the heavily armed militias that already control the streets. These soldiers, many of whom were shopkeepers or unemployed before the revolution, do not represent anything like a unified army. Berbers from the western mountains control Tripoli’s central square, while the port is dominated by Misratan rebels, the same force that is claiming the credit for killing Gaddafi. Yet another group of rebels control the airport.
Heavily armed and intoxicated by their famous victory, all these militias – who have already marked out their own territories – represent different regions and in some cases rival ideologies. Already, street fights are breaking out spontaneously in Tripoli, and there is a real danger that as time passes, these encounters could turn into battles. 
Each of these rebel bands is heavily armed, proud of its new status, and confident that it represents the real power in post-Gaddafi Libya. Their attitude to chairman Jalil, the scrupulous and well-educated former judge who impressed William Hague in an hour-long meeting last Monday, can border on the contemptuous. I am told by reliable sources that some of the rebels have already made it known that they will not serve under him for long.
At stake is the Gaddafi legacy – above all, more than £100 billion in the Libyan sovereign wealth fund treated for so long as a private bank account by Saif Gaddafi, who was courted and wooed by Western bankers and politicians for a slice of the action. Who will control that money now? Who will take over the luxurious urban and rural retreats that were lived in by members of the extended Gaddafi family? Who will run the state monopolies and enjoy the lucrative commission payments for government contracts? Who will form the new political elite?
These questions could be safely left unresolved while the liberation war was being fought and the biggest militia leaders were away at the front. The rebels were united by a common cause – the destruction of the most notorious and brutal Arab leader since Saddam Hussein. That will now change. The NTC has long promised that the fall of Sirte – the last seaport to remain loyal to Gaddafi – would mark the moment when the revolution would be placed on a formal footing and a transitional government declared.
According to Jalil’s schedule, this government will prepare the way for elections in eight months’ time. It looks promising on paper, but everything may yet turn out far more complex in practice. The problems facing the new administration are massive. Gaddafi’s military barracks have been emptied of their weapons, which are, as a result, available on the black market at rock bottom prices – the price of a Kalashnikov has plunged from $4,000 to $800 over the last few months.
The new army chief, Suleiman Mahmoud, formerly Gaddafi’s commander in the Tobruk region, is concerned about the proliferation of weapons on the streets, and is studying ways of stripping the militias of their guns. One plan is to buy back the weapons, a scheme that failed in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001 – the Afghan warriors pocketed the money and bought cheaper rifles or machine guns on the black market.
Another plan is to provide grants for militiamen to return to civilian life and start new businesses. Some of the rebels can certainly be absorbed into a new national army. But all of this is very difficult. Worryingly, Mahmoud enjoys little or none of the popular legitimacy of the militia commanders.
The problem is not just confined to Libya. Already the armaments stockpiled by Gaddafi are pouring into neighbouring countries through Libya’s porous and unpoliced borders, a potent menace in a region already destabilised by popular revolutions and the rise of al-Qaeda through the Maghreb.
The biggest nightmare, however, concerns Gaddafi’s anti-aircraft missiles. The late Libyan leader is believed to have stockpiled some 20,000 of these so-called Man Portable Air Defence Systems, known colloquially as Manpads. These formed a burning subject for discussion between Mr Hague and chairman Jalil – and no wonder. Each of these weapons, which can fit into a car boot, can down a commercial airliner. Indeed, missiles like these have been used in attacks on some 40 aircraft over the past four decades, causing more than 800 deaths.
Already, US security sources are warning that some have left the country, to be put to lethal use elsewhere. I have been told that barely 600 are so far accounted for, leaving more than 19,000 at large. There are fears that they could end up being used in the Middle East, perhaps even in London.
So it is essential that Gaddafi’s forces are brought into the new transitional government. If the weapon-rich tribes loyal to Gaddafi are excluded or victimised, they could continue guerrilla operations. They may well form lethal coalitions of convenience with the terrorist groups already operating in the area, particularly in the vast southern Libyan desert.
The NTC leaders are aware of this and are determined to embrace all but the most murderous Gaddafi supporters. Yet at ground level, the signs are troubling indeed, with reports of a fresh wave of reprisal killings over the past few days.
So the killing of Gaddafi has not brought the Libyan revolution to an end. In the words of one Tripoli-based Western diplomat: “The question now is: who owns the revolution?” Britain and France have our own narrative. We believe and hope that Gaddafi’s overthrow is an essential moment in the advance of democracy and freedom, not just in Libya but throughout North Africa and the Middle East. 
This vision, shared by many Libyans who simply want security and the rule of law, is possible. With its immense oil wealth, Libya has every prospect of becoming a secure, well-ordered, prosperous Mediterranean state.
But there are other agendas. The militias are certain to demand, as a reward for their role in the overthrow of Gaddafi, a share in Libyan wealth and power. Then there are the foreign actors whose motives remain sinister or mysterious. China is seeking contracts from the new government and access to Libyan mineral resources – and is unscrupulous about how it achieves them. Most of all, the motives of the Qataris, who funded and supplied weapons to the rebels in the early days of the liberation struggle, remain troubling. What will they ask for? Will they throw their weight behind the strong Islamic elements among the rebels, who will also be disappointed if they do not play a strong role in the new Libyan state?
There was never any doubt, once Nato entered the fray, that Gaddafi would at some stage be defeated. The great question was what would happen once he went. Revolutions notoriously devour their own – and we have now entered the defining stage. Elections are scheduled for the early summer of next year. If they do indeed take place peacefully and fairly, then David Cameron and French President Nicolas Sarkozy will be able to claim, tentatively, that their joint Libyan intervention has been a true success.
