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Saturday, December 27, 2008

enough is enough

Why war is n’t an option
Barkha Dutt
I just got an email from a friend in Pakistan. He had written just five words: do something; stop this war. War? I wrote back arguing that there was no war to run scared from and that the illusion of an imminent catastrophe had been manufactured on the other side. Our dialogue collapsed in a dead-end, which may work well for TV talk but not in real life. Most Pakistanis I have been speaking to in the last one month are convinced that the
Indians are coming. And most Indians, with the inarticulateness that comes with rage, want the government to “do something”. We just aren’t sure what that “something” can or should be.
We are frustrated and angry that even a month after the Bombay attacks, there is no tangible shift in the way Islamabad is respo-nding. If anything, things have only got worse. Even the UN-pushed crackdown on the Jamaat-ud-Dawa (the ideolo-gical launchpad and political front of the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba) has turned out to be cosmetic. And Masood Azhar — the terrorist who walked free in exchange for the safety of the IC-814 passengers — has vanished, after being declared under house arrest. The flip-flops are brazen enough to destroy diplomacy.
And yet, the truth — painful as it may be to families who have suffered directly in the Bombay attacks — is this: war is not an option; it is neither practical nor desirable. First, there are the commonsensical reasons to rule it out. A military conflict will not manage to eliminate the seeds of terrorism that are sown deep into the subsoil of Pakistan’s strategic architecture. Washington cannot be treated as the automatic deterrent to nuclear conflict; the stakes are too high, the game too risky. A civilian establishment that does not trust its own institutions to investigate the assassination of Benazir Bhutto (the centrepiece of the PPP’s election campaign was the promise of a UN probe) will hardly be able to control rogue players with a mind of their own, in case of a war. Even surgical strikes (bound to escalate into a full-blown conflict) don’t have ready targets to plan with. Terror camps can be swiftly dismantled and resurrected at new locations once the conflict is over. A military conflict does not even guarantee that the Indian forces can come home with Dawood Ibrahim, Hafiz Saeed or Masood Azhar. So, what would we really achieve by risking the lives of our soldiers?
But for those who dismiss all this as arguments made by the fainthearted, there’s a more compelling reason not to consider war: India would be playing straight into the hands of Pakistan’s military regime. Talk to Pakistani commentators and they agree that a war with India strengthens the Pakistan army like nothing else has or could in the past year. Some even suggest that precision air strikes by India will present a near-perfect scenario for the Pakistan military. Islamabad will retaliate without immediately risking the fatalities of on-ground conflict; Washington will jump in within days and the military will be back in the centrestage of public approval. This, in a country, where just a few months ago, General Pervez Musharraf was pushed out unceremoniously and the army was blamed for everything from the rise of the Taliban to the price of onions.
Bhutto’s tragic assassination (blamed by her own people on elements in the security establishment) was meant to usher in a political revolution. Exactly a year back, in December, I remember sitting in the Bhutto House at Larkana, and feeling goosebumps when Bilawal Bhutto announced in a trembling voice that that “democracy” would be the “best revenge” for his mother’s murder. But we have seen that democracy being whittled down systematically. Many in Pakistan believe that sections of the ISI and the Army have moved in with quiet, but brutal aggression because President Asif Ali Zardari was moving too quickly in peace talks with India. The offer of a no-first use of N-weapons; the consent to start border trade across the line of control, the attempts to reign in the ISI and the willingness (at least on paper) to investigate its role in the Kabul bombings — none of this made Zardari popular with his own security establishment. And frankly, in the last month it has become clear that neither Zardari nor Nawaz Sharif is the author of this script any longer. The refusal to send the ISI chief to India, pushing Sharif to retract his statement on Pakistani involvement in the Bombay attacks, and now the artificial war hysteria created by moving troops and flying air force jets over residential areas — all have the imprint of a larger plan — one that goes well beyond the terrorist strikes in Bombay.
By whipping up the impression of imminent war, Islamabad’s security establishment is hoping to catapult itself back into the role of saviour. It isn’t my argument that India should be overly concerned about the inner failings of Pakistan’s experiment with democracy. Our decisions should be guided by self-interest. And so we must ask, does India want to strengthen the very section of the Pakistani power structure that it sees as innately hostile to us?
Yes, the domestic mood remains one of “enough is enough.” And contrary to the rather over-imaginative understanding of some TV-bashers that this was an exhortation to war, it’s a simple, effective phrase (first used passionately by Shobhaa De) to capture the mood of a country that is no longer willing to accept a system that lets us down and fails to protect us. But before we demand quick-fix solutions on moving against Pakistan, let us ask ourselves this: are we helping India? India must now look for an unconventional solution that lies somewhere between war and peace.
Barkha Dutt is Group Editor, English News, NDTV

Sunday, December 14, 2008

Truth Behind Border

Into The Heart Of Darkness

HARINDER BAWEJA visits Muridke, the headquarters of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and goes behind the mask of piety to discover the face of terror

YOU ARE in an educational complex but you are from India and you work for TEHELKA, so it will take you time to change your mind,’’ is what Abdullah Muntazir, (my guide and the spokesperson for the foreign media), threw at me within minutes of us reaching Muridke, believed worldwide to be the headquarters of the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT). It was perhaps, for the first time, that due permission had been granted to any Indian journalist to visit the sprawling campus that lies 40 kms out of Lahore. The barricade that leads to the complex is heavily guarded, and no one can enter without prior consent.
The guided tour took me through a neatly laid out 60-bed hospital, schools for boys and girls, a madarsa, a mosque, an exorbitantly large swimming pool and a guest house. Nestled between tall trees and a meshed wire boundary, the 75-acre complex has manicured lawns, turnip farms and a fish-breeding centre. The students who enroll in the school pay a fee while those who study in the madarsa and pass out as masters in Islamic studies can come for free. Learning English and Arabic from class one on is compulsory, as is a course in computers.
"Welcome to the headquarters of the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba. You think a terrorist organisation will be based just a few metres away from the main Grand Trunk Road?’’ is the next loaded statement. The administrators of the complex, drawn from the LeT’s political wing, Jamaat-ud- Dawa, are clearly at pains to disassociate themselves from the group widely believed to be behind the terror attack in Mumbai on 26/11. Other foreign journalists were guided through the complex a few days before my visit. During their orchestrated tour, they saw students working in chemistry and physics laboratories, peering into microscopes and connecting electric circuits.
None of us went there thinking we would see firing ranges or target shooting in progress, but the tour itself is surreal, because even as you walk through the neatly trimmed lawns and veer left or right to see the hostel or the mosque or the hospital, the conversation itself is dotted entirely with words like terrorism, lashkar and in my case, Kashmir. Even though the gates have been opened — after clearance from Pakistan’s security agencies (read ISI) — to dispel the impression of Muridke being the training camp that "India has made it out to be,’’ the conversation is not about the school syllabus but wholly about how India is an enemy.
ADAY AFTER I visited Muridke, I met a family whose sister-in-law lives right next to the complex. "But of course it’s a training ground. You can hear slogans for jehad blaring out of loudspeakers in full volume and you can also sometimes hear the sound of gunfire,’’ members of this family confided. But during the two hours that I spent within the complex, there was enough conversation about jehad even if there were no signs of it being a sanctuary, not just for the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, but for Ramzi Yousef, an al-Qaeda operative, and one of the conspirators of the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing.
Kasav, the lone terrorist who was captured alive in Mumbai, is supposed to have studied here, according to his interrogators, and its time to ask some straight questions.
So did Kasav study here, in Muridke? Even if he did, we are not responsible for what any one of our students do after passing out.
Do you support the LeT? We used to. You used to? Yes, we were like-minded but the group was banned after Indian propaganda following the attack on its Parliament, which was done by the Jaishe-Mohammad and not the LeT. We used to provide logistical help to the Lashkar, collect funds for them and look after their publicity.
Did you also provide them with arms?
They must have bought weapons with the money we gave them. They were obviously not using the money to buy flowers for the Indian Army.
The Lashkar has claimed responsibility for the attack on the Red Fort in Delhi and the airport in Srinagar.
We do not consider Kashmir to be a part of India. It is a part of Pakistan. Those who attack the security forces are not terrorists, they are freedom fighters.
President Musharraf moved away from the position that Kashmir either secede or be given independence. He proposed joint control.
Pervez Musharraf did not enjoy any legitimacy. He had no business making such proposals.
Do you consider India an enemy?
Without doubt. India is responsible for the attack on Islamabad’s Marriot hotel, for the bomb blasts in Peshawar. Sarabjit Singh has been convicted of being a RAW agent.
Your Amir, Hafiz Sayeed, has given calls for jehad.
He supports the freedom movement in Kashmir. We think it is right. It is ridiculous to call him a terrorist. When India is even pricked by a thorn, the whole world stands up. Why did Condoleezza Rice not put pressure on India for handing over Narendra Modi after the Gujarat carnage?
Kashmir is no longer entirely indigenous. Foreign fighters like Maulana Masood Azhar were arrested in Anantnag.
He was a journalist and still is an inspirational writer. Anyone from here can go to Kashmir. We do not see it as part of India. Did you sanitise this place before bringing me in?
This is an educational complex and the Jamaat-ud-Dawa is a charitable organisation. There are very few people here because of the Eid break.
Does the ISI support you?
He just laughs.
THE JAMAAT-UD-DAWA, which was banned by the US in 2005 for being a Lashkar front, draws patronage from the ISI and though proscribed abroad, has a free run in Pakistan. It has branches all across the country and is as famous for the social work it renders, as it is infamous for its terror activities. It sees itself as a movement and not an organisation and has appeal to many in rural and urban areas. When the Observer correspondent went to Kasav’s village in Faridkot, just off a town called Depalpur close to the border with India, to establish if he indeed was a Pakistani, he was told that "religious clerics were brainwashing youths in the area and that LeT’s founder Hafiz Sayeed had visited nearby Depalpur. There was a LeT office in Depalpur, but that had hurriedly been closed down in the past few days. The LeT paper is distributed in Depalpur and Faridkot."
The Jamaat-ud-Dawa has a wide base and operates 140 schools and 29 seminaries in different towns and cities of Pakistan. According to the Jamaat’s website, "Islam does not mean following a few rituals like performing prayers, keeping fasts, performing the pilgrimage to the Ka’ba (Hajj), giving alms (Zakat), or donating to charitable works, but in fact, it is a complete Code of Life. That is why Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s struggle is not limited to any particular aspect of life only; rather, Jamaat-ud-Dawa addresses each and every field of life according to the teachings of Islam. Jamaat-ud-Dawa is a movement that aims to spread the true teachings of Islam, and to establish a pure and peaceful society by building the character of individuals according to those teachings." Its appeal extends to urban professionals like doctors who were out in large numbers in Muzaffarabad (the capital of Azad Kashmir or POK, depending on which side of the line of control you are on) in 2005, after a devastating earthquake. Unlike the Taliban, the Jamaat is modelled after Hamas and is not merely an army with gun-toting members but a complex and intricate organisation with a social and political agenda. It has a huge following and reports have often indicated that in its annual congregations, where Hafiz Sayeed gives a call for jehad, as many as 100,000 people are present in the sprawling Muridke compound.
IT IS groups like the Jamaat and the Jaish-e-Mohammad — started by Maulana Masood Azhar soon after he was set free in Kandahar — that both India and Pakistan are up against.
The complete U-turn, post 9/11 when General Musharraf lent complete support to George Bush, saw Pakistan take a slow but sure journey that has today placed it on a dangerous crosshair. While Musharraf joined the war against terror — forced to by Bush who had infamously said you are either with us or against us — he also got isolated from his own people who took to the streets, openly protesting his support of America that was bombing and strafing civilians, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq. The last straw on the camel’s back — to use a cliché — came when his own army stormed the Lal Masjid in Islamabad in mid-2007. Reports of machine guns being used against innocents who got trapped in the Masjid, converted many within the army and the ISI and those who had retired from these outfits. It was the tipping point for former ISI chief Lt Gen Assad Durrani, who says, "It was the most blatant homage paid to the Americans. The mosque is located under the nose of the ISI headquarter and you cannot first allow it to become a fortress and then fire on people who were willing to surrender."
The storming of the Lal Masjid was a tipping point in more ways than one. If the release of Masood Azhar and the subsequent formation of the Jaish saw the advent of fidayeen attacks in Kashmir, the Lal Masjid operation led equally to the birth of intense attacks by suicide bombers. The suicide attacks were not just targeting civilians, they were seeking men in uniform and the figures, in fact, tell the story. The first half of 2007 saw 12 such attacks all over Pakistan, between January and July 3, and an estimated 75 people were killed. But after the Lal Masjid operation which reduced large parts of it to rubble, 44 suicide attacks took place between July and December, killing 567 people, mostly the members of the military and paramilitary forces, ISI and the police. December also saw the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, a grim reminder of the fact that the militants had declared a war against their ex-masters. The attack on Islamabad’s Marriot Hotel, the city’s most high-profile landmark, only confirmed the fact that terror can strike at will, any time and anywhere. It confirmed also that terror was not restricted to Pakistan’s tribal belt alone. President Musharraf himself had, in fact, also survived three assassination attempts and now lives under extremely tight security. The terror threat in Pakistan, can, in fact, be gauged from the fact that both President Asif Zardari and the Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, in a complete first, offered Eid prayers at their respective residences on December 9.
The wave of suicide attacks in Pakistan and neighbouring Afghanistan does not just testify to the revival of al Qaeda and the Taliban networks but as Ahmed Rashid, strategic writer and author of several books on the jehadi networks, says, "The army is embroiled in fighting these forces in the Frontier and one-third of the country is not even in the state’s control. This is hardly the time to pick a fight with India."
THE RATCHETING up of tension and animosity between India and Pakistan after the Mumbai terror attack on 26/11, points to another dangerous faultline — while the Pakistani Army joined the global war against terror, it never completely gave up its support to the jehadi network that is active on its border with India. Even after Lashkar and Jaish were banned, neither were their back accounts frozen, nor was there any attempt at forcing them to shut shop. The Army and the ISI continued to support fronts like the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which does more than just equip men with arms. It motivates and indoctrinates minds, and as Rashid points out, "Musharraf used to place Hafiz Sayed and Masood Azhar under house arrest for Western consumption. He may have stopped infiltrating them into Kashmir too under international pressure, but there was no attempt to stop their activities in Pakistan after they were banned. They were just allowed to hang loose." Concurs former interior secretary Tasneem Noorani, "There was no effort to mainstream the radicals."
Kasav’s journey from a remote village in Faridkot to Mumbai is a testimony to this. So is his revelation to his interrogators that he was trained by a ‘Major’. Zardari may have been right when he attributed the Mumbai attack to ‘nonstate actors’ because the Major does not necessarily have to be a serving officer employed with the ISI. "Retired ISI officers are helping the Pakistani Taliban and they have become more Lashkar than the Lashkar,’’ is how Rashid puts it but any number of strategic and security analysts will testify to this dangerous trend — to how ex-ISI officers are still in business because they have now attached themselves as advisors to militant organisations like the Lashkar and the Jaish. Admits one such analyst, who prefers not to be named, "You don’t need large training camps. Ex-servicemen are imparting arms training within the compounds of their homes. Different officials are attached with different groups."
The switch from one alias to another — Lashkar-e-Tayyeba, Markaz-e-Toiba, Markaz-e-Dawah-Irshad, Jamaat-ud- Dawa — speaks of the Establishment’s (the Army and ISI combine are referred to as the Establishment in Pakistan) more than subtle support of groups that are used against India. The long-standing relationship between the Establishment and the India-bound militants is now under pressure. The overriding message from America after the Mumbai attack is for these groups to be reined in. This is testing not just the army’s carefully crafted support for the militants but has also focused attention on yet another faultline — the equation between the Establishment and the civilian government.
Committed to better relations with India, Pakistan’s top-most civilian representatives responded instinctively to the horror in Mumbai, in keeping with what Zardari had told the Hindustan Times Leadership Summit, held a few days before the gun and grenade battle at Nariman House and the Taj and Oberoi hotels. In what took the Indian Government by surprise, Zardari committed Pakistan to a no-first-use of nuclear weapons. It was the first major securityrelated statement to come from Pakistan’s Government after the February 18 election and more than just surprise the Indian Government, it caused unrest amongst its own Establishment. The next statement, made by Prime Minister Gilani — and confirmed through a press release issued by his office — pertained to the civilian government agreeing to sending its top-most ISI officer, Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha to India on Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s request.
The sequence of events following Gilani’s offer and Zardari’s quick retraction, saying they had agreed to send a director and not Director General Pasha, in fact speaks of the internal battle of supremacy between the Establishment and the civilian authorities, especially on the crucial issue of national security, which the army believes to be its exclusive domain. As Imtiaz Alam, a peace worker and head of the South Asian Free Media Association, who had dinner with Zardari a day after the Mumbai attack put it, "Zardari is very firm on terrorism. He thinks democracy is a better weapon but the terrorists have succeeded in creating a psychological gulf between India and Pakistan. Instead of Pakistan fighting the jehadis, it has become a fight between India and Pakistan."
Senior journalists in Pakistan admit that briefings from the ISI changed the post-Mumbai discourse. Reacting perhaps to the loud, jingoistic demands on Indian television channels for action against Pakistan, the ISI told a select group of journalists that India had in fact ‘summoned’ their chief. In these briefings, the ISI is also surprisingly and shockingly supposed to have reffered to Baitullah Mehsud — Benazir Bhutto’s assasin — as a ‘patriotic Pakistani’. The Jamaat-ud-Dawa Amir, Hafiz Sayeed — with a clear nod from his handlers — appeared on one news channel after another, making the same points: that the list of 20 most wanted which also includes him, was old hat, that India was playing the blame game without evidence, that India had its own band of ‘Hindu terrorists’ and India should give freedom to Kashmir and end the matter once and for all. The leak soon after, of the hoax call, purportedly made by Minister of External Affairs Pranab Mukherji to President Zardari, sealed the debate — India bashing was back in business. The jingoism overtook the more important debate of the threat Pakistan itself faced from terror networks flourishing on its soil.
PAKISTAN’S NEWS channels went on overdrive and as some even blared war songs, the question that gained importance through all the din, was — who really runs Pakistan? Who is in control?
The answers to the questions are both easy and complex. Mushahid Hussain, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee in the Senate, is clearheaded on the answer: "War on terror, national security and relations with India, Afghanistan and China are the domain of the army. Thanks to India, the army has been rehabilitated and the war bugles are all over. No one person, no one institution is running Pakistan. Musharraf ran a one window operation and the army and the ISI used to report to him, but now decision making is murky and that is causing confusion. The hoax call and the DG ISI controversy are symptomatic of that."
THERE ARE other examples. Only a few months ago, Zardari quickly retracted on his effort to bring the ISI under the control of the Interior Ministry. And even as the Pakistan Government’s response to Indian pressure to rein in the terror networks, plays itself out on a day-to-day basis, it is evident that the civilian authorities have had to embrace the Establishment’s point of view vis-a-vis India. Therefore, the talk that India should provide concrete evidence. Therefore, Zardari’s statement that the guilty — if found guilty — will be tried on Pakistani soil. That the 20 most wanted will not be handed over. Even on sourced reports, put out in the local media, that Masood Azhar had been put under house arrest, Prime Minister Gilani went on record to say that no such report had come to him yet.
If India believes that Pakistan’s response has been poor — two Lashkar men, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi and Zarrar Shah have been arrested in Muzaffarbad — it is because the government here is tied down by the Establishment and pressure from its own people. It cannot be seen to be buckling under pressure either from India or the US.
Some moves seem to be on the cards, including the banning of the Jamaat-ud- Dawa. But Lashkar was banned in the past, as was the Jaish. Prime Minister Gilani has committed to not allowing Pakistani soil to be used for terror attacks, but then Musharraf had made the same exact promise on January 12, 2002 soon after Parliament was attacked in New Delhi.
Former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has gone as far as to say that "Pakistan needs to set its own house in order’’but he is in the Opposition and he can afford to make such statements. If Pakistan has begun to resemble a house of terror, it is because the army and the ISI are yet to change their stance, not just vis-a-vis India but vis-a-vis the terrorists they create and support. Until then, the sprawling compound in Muridke will continue to remain in business. If the Jamaat-ud-Dawa does get banned, all it will need is another alias.
From Tehelka Magazine, Vol 5, Issue 50, Dated Dec 20, 2008

Monday, December 08, 2008

Major election boost for India's Congress party

NEW DELHI : India's ruling Congress party has scored unexpected wins in a string of state elections, officials said Monday, defying predictions of a voter backlash after the Mumbai attacks and an economic downturn.
Election Commission officials said the governing party had chalked up victories in the capital area New Delhi and in the remote northeastern state of Mizoram as results from five state polls held over the past month came in.
Official figures also showed Congress well on track to wrest power from its main rival, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in the northern desert state of Rajasthan.
The polls -- which have seen straight fights between the Congress and the BJP -- are viewed as a key indicator of voter intentions ahead of national elections due by May 2009 at the latest. The BJP, however, was likely to retain its hold over the central states of Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh, media projections said.
BJP president Rajnath Singh described the projected Delhi results as "shocking as we thought we would win."
The party also conceded defeat in Rajasthan, with incumbent chief minister Vasundhra Raje saying she respected "the people's verdict" and promising to "play the role of a constructive opposition."
The results are an important boost for Congress, which leads the federal coalition government but has been on the ropes over the economic slowdown and punishing inflation.
The government's record on national security has also come under the spotlight following the Islamic militant attacks in Mumbai, which left 172 dead, including nine gunmen, and exposed India's intelligence failings.
Definitive results were expected later Monday, but supporters of Delhi's Chief Minister Sheila Dikshit were already celebrating outside her official residence -- distributing sweets and dancing to drum beats.
"Many thanks to the people of Delhi who supported us and our slogans of development and progress," a smiling Dikshit told cheering colleagues.
"It's an outright rejection" of the BJP playing up "the terror card," she said adding: "The people of Delhi have given a fitting reply."
During the more recent polls -- held as Mumbai was still under a state of siege -- the BJP had painted Congress as being "soft on terror."
Congress party spokeswoman Jayanti Natarajan admitted the Mumbai terror attack had been a "worrying factor" for party strategists.
But another Congress spokesman Tom Vadakkan said the results "showed that terror is a national issue and not an issue patented by one party."
Political analyst Rasheed Kidwai described the expected Congress victory in Delhi as "a very, very remarkable achievement."
"Bucking anti-incumbency is a big thing, but the Delhi chief minister has also beaten the BJP's twin campaign planks -- price rises and terror," said Kidwai. (AFP)

Sunday, December 07, 2008

Bombay Attacks

The rampaging elephant


Vir Sanghvi, Hindustan Times
I wrote last week that I had never known such anger in urban India as we have witnessed after the Bombay attacks. Over a week after the attacks ended, the fury has not dissipated. Rather it has spun almost entirely out of control.
I have no problems with anger. It is often the precursor to change. Unless Indians make it clear that they are mad as hell and are not going to take it any longer, the system will never change.
My problem is with misdirected anger. Over the last ten days, the great Indian upper middle class (and especially those who live in South Bombay) has resembled nothing as much as a marauding elephant on a pointless rampage. Anger has overcome reason. The right targets are missed. And genuine grievances are trivialised when vapid Page 3 morons go on television and talk of sending more Indian soldiers to their deaths while they themselves sit back and wait for the re-opening of Wasabi.
Rarely have I heard as much nonsense as has been spouted over the last week. God knows, I was born into the South Bombay elite. The institutions that were attacked mean as much to me as they do to anybody else. (Just see my story on the Taj in today’s Brunch if you don’t believe me.)

Now the anger is so diffused and so unconstructive that I doubt if it will achieve anything more. So, what went wrong? Why did we suddenly lose our focus...

But I’m still appalled by the kind of rubbish that is emerging from the mouths of the Frangipani-Vetro set: don’t pay your taxes; give up on democracy; hand the country over to the army; refuse to vote; carpet-bomb Pakistan; worry about the Indian Muslims in our slums who fly Pakistani flags; hide at home till the anniversary of the Babri Masjid has passed; never question the police and para-drop Raj Thackeray into Pakistan. (Frankly, I have to concede that the last one does have a certain appeal....)
When the attacks began, I applauded the anger. It did make a difference. Nobody ever loses his job in India because of failure. But such was the public rage that three heads promptly rolled: the Union Home Minister, the Chief Minister of Maharashtra and the Deputy Chief Minister.
But now the anger is so diffused and so unconstructive that I doubt if it will achieve anything more. So, what went wrong? Why did we suddenly lose our focus and start striking out wildly in all directions?
My theory is : impotence.
Absolute power, as we know, corrupts. But so does absolute impotence. And the current rage seems directionless and random mainly because it stems from our impotence.
The ‘Do-something-now!’ anger has given way to the hysterical rage that comes out of frustration.
The frustration exists on many levels but the most important one is class. One of the problems with universal franchise is that an educated person has exactly the same one vote as an illiterate. This means that the middle class — visible, articulate symbols of the Indian story — can write articles (like this one) or clog TV channels but we can never ever bring down a government.
We simply do not have the numbers.
Even in big cities such as Bombay, no constituency (not even South Bombay) can be swung by middle class votes. Politicians need the poor to get elected.
You could argue (as I do) that this is a good thing: it makes India a fairer society. But it does mean that the middle class has zero political relevance. It is heartening to see 200 people gather at the Gateway. But Bombay is a city of 13 million. The 200,000 wouldn’t even show up on an electoral map.
It is significant that even as the middle class railed against politicians, voter turn-out reached record levels in such states as Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and even Delhi. Though the middle class wanted to have nothing more to do with the political system, Indian democracy continued to flourish.
At some subliminal level, we recognise our political irrelevance. When we complain about vote-bank politics, about elections being decided by people in the slums etc. what are we really saying? We are saying that others control India’s political destiny. And there’s nothing we can do about it.
That frustration explains our anger against politicians. It explains why we don’t want to vote. It explains why we want to withhold our taxes. It explains why we regard politicians on par with terrorists: ‘Never mind those who come by boats,’ runs one widely circulated SMS, ‘worry about those come up by votes.’
Hence the anger of the rampaging elephant: it is an impotent rage.
The other primary cause of our frustration is that we do not know how to avenge the horrors of Bombay. And that accounts for much of the fury.
When the US had to respond after 9/11, it knew where to go. Osama bin Laden was being given shelter by the Taliban in Afghanistan. The Americans asked the Taliban to hand over bin Laden. When the Taliban refused, America invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban. Once Kabul fell, America had closure of a sort: 9/11 had been avenged.
But what can we do? The attacks appear to be the work of the Lashkar-e-Tayyeba. The LeT was set up in connivance with the ISI to foment trouble in Kashmir, and while it may once have had official backing, nobody seriously believes that President Asif Ali Zardari and his party either support it or have any control over it.
However, Pakistan has a more complex power structure than India. The army does not necessarily listen to civilian presidents. The ISI reports to the army but doesn’t necessarily tell the chief everything. And there are vast private armies controlled by retired generals and former ISI officials which have links with the Lakshar.
The most likely explanation for the Bombay attacks is that the Pakistan army and ISI were coming under increasing pressure from the Americans to crack down in Pakistan’s tribal areas where bin Laden and his men are believed to be holed up and needed a diversion. It is not politically expedient for the Pakistani army (or any Pakistan government) to kill Pakistanis in the tribal areas at the behest of Washington or even to hand bin Laden over.
So, the Pakistan Army needed a new front. Already troops have been moved from the border with Afghanistan to the Indian border. The Pakistanis have told the Americans that they cannot proceed quickly with the operation in the tribal areas because of the threat of a retaliatory Indian strike in the wake of the Bombay attacks.
In such a situation, what can New Delhi do?
If we attack Pakistan, we play the Pakistan Army’s game: the Pakistanis know that the world will intervene to stop two nuclear powers from fighting before any serious damage is done to Pakistan. If we destablise Zardari, we hand Pakistan back to the army.
One option is a surgical strike aimed at training camps in Pakistani Kashmir. But this is no more than symbolic. Contrary to the popular image, these camps are not well-equipped military bases. They are makeshift operations run in schools and college buildings over the weekend. Take one out and they’ll just move elsewhere. Plus, we run the risk of killing civilians.
So there is no easy retribution available, no obvious means of revenge and no prospect of closure. That accounts for another level of impotence. We feel that terrorists have had the audacity to walk into our greatest city and shoot people at will — and we are unable to do anything about it.
The frustration is understandable. There are no quick fixes. But on both scores, there are long-term solutions available and we must work towards them. The problem with our political system is that parties have no mechanism to allow talent to rise through the ranks. So Indian politics is a squalid, corrupt family business. I found it strange that nobody in Bombay made this point. Instead, they listened to young dynasts who appeared on TV to lecture us. Such is our class bias that if politicians speak good English we think they are okay. And politics never changes.
Similarly, the only way to fight terrorism is through covert operations and better intelligence, not through carpet-bombing. Our intelligence agencies are demoralised and faction-ridden. They need more money and better leadership.
Sadly, we are not making any of these points or thinking constructively. We are just flailing about angrily in all directions.
As long as public anger is random and unfocused, nothing will change.
And the terrorists will strike again.